We’re All Infected: Legal Personhood, Bare Life and The Walking Dead by Travis, M
1 
 
We’re All Infected; Legal Personhood, Bare Life and The Walking Dead 
Word Count: 6,906 
 
Comics may not provide us with [an] itemized vision of the new justice for which we 
yearn in these hard times, but it can warn us about the intrinsic shortcomings of our 
fading ideological hopes and point us towards new horizons.[16:22]  
 
You told me there was no cure, that these people were dead, not sick. I chose not to 
believe it. But when Shane shot Lou in the chest and she just kept coming, that's when 
I knew what an ass I've been. That Annette had been dead long ago and I was feeding 
a rotten corpse! That's when I knew there was no hope. And when that little girl came 
out of the barn, the look on your face - I knew you knew it too. Right? There is no 
hope. And you know it, like I do. Don't you? There is no hope for any of us. [38: 208]  
 
Introduction 
 
   This article considers the zombie as a signifier using the popular comic book and television 
series The Walking Dead as a point of critical departure. Not only is it one of the most recent 
cultural portrayals of the zombie narrative but its serialised style allows a broader 
interrogation of the relationships between law, humanity and zombies. The central question 
this article asks is what does our cultural fascination with the figure of the zombie point 
towards? It analyses the zombie through existing medical law on permanent vegetative states, 
Agamben’s understanding of ‘bare life’ and Esposito’s concept of ‘the third person’. It traces 
the interesting points of juxtaposition between these theories; particularly around acts and 
omissions on micro and macro scales. Ultimately, the article moves towards a rejection of 
legal personhood and advocates a move towards a human (or embodiment) centred approach 
to rights, although it is acknowledged that this is also contested by the figure of the zombie. 
This paper ultimately aims to provide evidence that the zombie is a concept worthy of 
2 
 
theoretical attention in the fields of cultural studies, law, philosophy and intersections that 
exist between these fields. 
 
The Walking Dead 
 
   It is perhaps important to note the typology of the zombie narrative that this article is 
situated within. The Walking Dead utilizes a type of zombie that began with George A. 
Romero’s Night of the Living Dead [33]. The film took place at the height of the cold war and 
thus projected two of America’s greatest anxieties. Firstly, the film deals with the idea of the 
enemy within – communist sympathisers who had already infected the sovereignty of the 
USA [17]. Secondly, the film highlights a growing cultural concern with the fallout of the 
atomic bomb [8].  More recently, these ideas have been filtered through languages of 
contagion [6, 34], commodification [24, 6] and chemical warfare [9]. The figure of the 
zombie in both Romero’s films and The Walking Dead exhibit a number of characteristics, 
firstly, they appear dead in the sense that they are undergoing various stages of 
decomposition and rigor mortis. Secondly, in contrast to the dead they are capable of both 
movement and desire (although their desires are confined to the consumption of human 
flesh). Thirdly, they cannot be killed by conventional means (with the exception of a sharp 
blow to the head). This article, therefore, distinguishes its discussion of zombies from the 
philosophical discussions of the zombie in consciousness studies. In this line of questioning 
the zombie is considered to be a being that is ‘functionally identical to us, but who have no 
consciousness’ [26]. These debates arose from a series of thought experiments conducted to 
ascertain whether we could ever know if another being had consciousness [21, 27]. Though 
consciousness is inevitably intertwined with any investigation of personhood it can be argued 
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that is not essential to determining persons in the legal sense. This will be made clearer 
though a discussion of the UK case of Bland [2].  
 
   The Walking Dead presents an interesting starting point for discussions of law and justice. 
The world as we know it has been swept away and much of the series (and comic book) deals 
with questions of loss and re-appropriation. The serialised nature of both the television series 
and the comic books allow for much more detail than the standardised zombie film. Indeed, 
in an interview, the creator of the comic book Robert Kirkman noted that his primary concern 
in writing the series was ‘what comes after [the hypothetical zombie film]’ [37]. In particular 
he was interested in the development of characters as they adapt to this new world [37]. 
Though the existing legal structure has been decimated these texts remain ‘lawful’ in the 
sense of being ‘full of law’ [42]. Law and justice become central tenants of what it means to 
be a human. The series centres around the character of Rick Grimes, a small town police 
officer from Atlanta, Georgia injured in the line of duty. Interestingly, Rick chooses to retain 
his identity as a police officer through the clothes that he wears and the mannerisms which he 
adopts. Both of which, perhaps holding a symbolic resonance, even where the discursive and 
institutional foundations that they rely upon, have been lost.  
 
   As a consequence, The Walking Dead is revealing of deeper cultural understandings around 
the importance of law and justice freed, somewhat, from the doctrine of precedent [40]. It is 
important to engage with these debates; what is it important to hold on to? And what can we 
go without? Science fiction is, according to Kieran Tranter, ‘the West’s mythform’ [39:818]. 
Science fiction, he continues, ‘…is the dreaming site for the West’s technological futures, a 
place for working through both the anxieties and promises of technological change’ [39:818]. 
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This article will consider how The Walking Dead deals with zombies, and as such, 
interrogates the deeper meanings and messages that are revealed about our cultural responses 
to legal personhood. In so doing, it engages with Gómez Romero and Dahlman’s 
conceptualisation of graphic novels as ‘a source of narratives on issues of legality, order and 
justice, but also as an alternative legal discourse that enables complex interactions between 
various epistemological standpoints’ [16:6]. In the following section we will outline a debate 
between the characters Rick Grimes and Hershel Greene around the potential of zombies to 
be treated as persons and the duties that society may consequently owe them. 
 
Hershel’s Choice 
 
Hershel: I saw the broadcasts before they stopped, saw the irrational fear, the 
atrocities, like the incident at my well. 
Dale: We put down a walker. 
Hershel: You killed a person. 
Dale: Well, if you watched the same broadcasts I did, you saw walkers attack, kill. 
They're dangerous. 
Hershel: A paranoid schizophrenic is dangerous too. We don't shoot sick people. 
Dale: With all due respect, you are cut off from the outside world here. But I've seen 
people that I cared about die and come back, and they're not people. 
Hershel: My wife and stepson are in that barn. They're people. 
Dale: I'm sorry. [38:206]  
 
   Over the course of series 2 of The Walking Dead and during Issues 11-14 of the comic book 
(collected in Miles Behind Us) an alternative perspective of zombies is outlined by the 
character of Hershel Greene. Hershel, a veterinarian-come-farmer is the owner of a barn 
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where the characters seek refuge. Seemingly in contrast to the rest of the world, Hershel 
refuses to ‘kill’ zombies. Instead, Hershel advocates treating them humanely - trapping them 
in a barn and feeding them – much to the dismay of the other characters. Part of Hershel’s 
rationale for this approach is that he believes that these individuals can be cured. He believes 
that they have merely contracted a virus and that in some point in the future their humanity 
(whatever this might entail) may be restored. Rick Grimes presents the alternative position. 
He is of the opinion that zombies are not people and that their humanity and any traces of 
legal rights or duties are lost. This happens not upon the moment of viral transmission (for 
example a zombie bite) but upon the moment of death [38:105].  
 
   Both positions may have been adopted for contextual reasons. Rick’s pragmatic position 
has been developed in a context of ‘life on the road’ and protecting his family and fellow 
survivors. In a sense, Rick has developed a permanent claim of self-defence towards zombies 
and as a consequence does not have to think about the issues of personhood that this evokes. 
Hershel, in contrast, has developed his approach from the safety of his own home. He has 
had, by his own admission, relatively few encounters with the living dead. Those encounters 
that he has had have been with neighbours, friends and family. He is unwilling to believe, 
that they could permanently be considered as no longer persons. These debates raise an 
intriguing proposition for theorists of legal personhood; can the dead have legal personhood?   
 
Can the Dead have Personhood?  
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Corpses provide an ambivalent point within the human/nonhuman issue as they are 
both and neither human/nonhuman – the were that do and don’t count. The corpse is 
the actual material residue of ‘the human.’ [25:339]  
 
   Legal personhood is a recurring theme in Western jurisprudence that has been utilised in a 
number of competing ways by a number of differing interest groups [28]. At different times, 
Naffine notes, personhood has been based upon concepts of rationality, ensoulment, 
embodiment and law [28]. These approaches are not exclusive and at various points colonize, 
compete and combine with one another. The approach taken by law to personhood is context 
dependent and will vary according to both the facts and the subjects to whom it refers [4, 23, 
31, 43]. Legal personhood, therefore, is not a static ascription based on clearly defined 
characteristics but is a space of active interplay between the discursive, the institutional and 
the material. This interplay demands two sites of interrogation. Firstly, the ‘active’ nature of 
personhood demands attention; what does activity mean and what happens to personhood in 
cases of inactivity? Secondly, are these activities understood differently through different 
sites of corporeality and embodiment?  
 
   Understanding personhood as active rather than static gives legitimacy to the value placed 
on autonomy in most Western understandings of personhood [28].  Combining the above 
questions around embodiment and dynamism we can view legal personhood as ‘the way in 
which autonomy and normativity are given legal value and recognition’ [41:13]. This 
definition only forms a part of the broad tapestry of legal personhood but offers a suitable 
starting point for discussion. Viewing personhood through this prism of autonomy is further 
supported by the states reluctance to impose upon autonomy; any other approach would 
contest the legal personhood of the individual. As a consequence, any encroachment of an 
individual’s autonomy by the state must be questioned in terms of activity and embodiment in 
order to determine its objectivity; both areas are potentially sites of discrimination.  
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   Ngaire Naffine encounters these problems in her discussion of Re MB (Medical Treatment) 
(1997) [32] in which the UK Court of Appeal considered a woman’s refusal to undergo a 
caesarian section due to her phobia of needles [29:16-17]. In this instance the activity 
(pregnancy) and embodiment (the pregnant female body) are intertwined. The subsequent 
denial of autonomy, for Naffine, can be read as a legal conflation between personhood and 
the masculine (normative) body. The Court’s decision to find MB incompetent allows her 
personhood, contextually and temporarily, to be suspended. Naffine notes that: 
 
[F]or most of the time, for most legal relationships, women clearly are persons. They 
can now bear personifying rights and responsibilities in much the same manner as 
men can as legal persons. But it is far less clear that women, as women, are persons in 
law. As soon as there is something about the condition of women which seems to 
mark them out as women, as specifically not-male, then problems of personification 
are encountered. [29:16-17]  
 
   The relationship between the body and the activity of pregnancy has led Naffine to 
conclude that it is women’s bodies that render them imperfect legal subjects [29:16-17]. 
However, disentangling the body and the activity is important for a clearer understanding of 
personhood. In this instance MB retained her personhood in terms of the duties she was owed 
and that she owed to others. For example, it would have been illegal for the nurse to 
purposefully kill her while her personhood was diminished and likewise MB could not have 
legally killed the nurse. Instead, it was the activity of pregnancy that allowed her personhood 
to be suspended and only in the context that it arose. Personhood is suspended, therefore, 
through a dynamic encounter between the material, the institutional and the discursive. 
Moreover, these issues highlight the importance of temporality to legal personhood in terms 
of both activity and embodiment. In relation to the dead, MacCormack notes that, ‘these 
ambiguities are further problematised when the object itself is a frontier between humanity (is 
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a corpse human?), temporality (it was, what is it now?), ideologies of respect and disgust.’ 
[25:345] 
 
   Framing legal personhood in terms of active autonomy, for the most part, settles the 
question of whether the dead have personhood. Brain stem death has been used as the test for 
death and has been defined in the UK through the Department of Health’s A Code of Practice 
for the Diagnosis of Brain Stem Death [11] which confirmed the caselaw of Re A [30] and 
Bland [2]. Here, embodiment and activity, or, more precisely, inactivity (and lack of response 
to stimuli such as pain, light and temperature) are again intertwined. Personhood is not just 
suspended but revoked. This has been somewhat confirmed in the European Court of Human 
Rights decision of Akpinar and another v Turkey [3] where it was held that Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (No one shall be subjected to ... inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment) did not apply to the dead finding that ‘the human quality 
is extinguished on death and, therefore, the prohibition on ill-treatment is no longer 
applicable to corpses.’ As MacCormack writes: 
 
The materiality of the corpse is emphasized here because the corpse is so material – 
stinkingly, rottingly, traumatically and viscerally so, actualising new layers of flesh…. 
The corpse is subjectivity as only matter and the ultimate symbol of humanity as 
nothing more than flesh, but flesh which is unknowable, whose pleasures evoke 
infinite possibility not available in a living body. [25:346]  
 
   Under these readings it could be suggested that personhood of the individual can be 
usefully disentangled from the body. This article suggests that a more helpful reading might 
be that the activities associated with living embodiment (breathing, cardio-function) provide 
the conditions under which personhood can be situated. Embodiment remains a central part of 
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our considerations of personhood in law [41, 29]. These issues are complicated, however, by 
the prospect of the walking dead. 
 
Zombies, Personhood and Permanent Vegetative States 
 
The cortex is that part of the brain which is the seat of cognitive function and sensory 
capacity. Anthony Bland cannot see, hear or feel anything. He cannot communicate in 
any way. The consciousness which is the essential feature of individual personality 
has departed for ever. On the other hand the brain stem, which controls the reflexive 
functions of the body, in particular heartbeat, breathing and digestion, continues to 
operate. In the eyes of the medical world and of the law a person is not clinically dead 
so long as the brain stem retains its function. [2: Per Lord Keith of Kinkel at 856] 
 
  The figure of the zombie invites a re-examination of the relationship between autonomy and 
legal personhood. Part of the problem centres around capacity; how can we evaluate the 
capacity of a zombie? However, even if we were to determine that a zombie had no capacity 
this would not necessarily mean that they did not have legal personhood. It might instead 
mean that they do not have responsibility for their own actions, but this does not definitively 
determine that others do not owe obligations towards them. Here we work through medical 
understandings of permanent vegetative states (PVS) in order to establish how humans 
without consciousness are treated in law. In each of these examples, although autonomy 
might be diminished (in relation to the activity taking place) there are still legal duties owed 
to the individual allowing them to be determined as persons. The suspension of personhood 
identified in Naffine [29] and Travis [41] occurs only in the context in which it arises. As a 
result, we tentatively find ourselves agreeing with Hershel identifying zombies as having a 
suspended personhood but perhaps still owing them legal obligations. In the following 
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exchange, we see Edwin Jenner, a scientist from the Center for Disease Control in The 
Walking Dead, explain the zombie infection: 
 
It invades the brain like meningitis. The adrenal glands haemorrhage, the brain goes 
into shutdown, then the major organs. Then death. Everything you ever were or ever 
will be gone…. The resurrection times vary wildly. We had reports of it happening in 
as little as three minutes. The longest we heard of was eight hours. In the case of this 
patient, it was two hours, one minute seven seconds…. 
- It restarts the brain?  
No, just the brain stem. Basically, it gets them up and moving. The frontal lobe, the 
neocortex, the human part-- that doesn't come back. The you part. Just a shell driven 
by mindless instinct. [38:106] 
 
  This scene, taken from the finale of season one of The Walking Dead offers an attempt at a 
scientific understanding of zombies. Its discussion of the active brain stem offers an 
interesting parallel with current legal and medical divisions between death and permanent 
vegetative states. It is clear that the activities that zombies engage in place them outside of 
traditional understandings of death but by focusing on the brain stem they would, under 
current legal and medical models, be considered to be alive. Their lack of capacity and 
rationality, however, places them outside the realms of full legal personhood. As a result, one 
of the best contemporary analogies to legal conceptualisations of the zombie is a 
consideration of the caselaw surrounding permanent vegetative states.  
 
   Medically, a permanent vegetative state (PVS) refers to a state in which the patient has no 
awareness of external stimuli including visual, auditory, tactile and are unable to 
communicate or show comprehension of communication. Patients in a state of PVS, however, 
do demonstrate brain-stem autonomic functions on a respiratory, cardiac and metabolic level. 
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Similarly, basic reflexes such as bowel and bladder functions will be partially retained.  With 
adequate care patients can live in this state for a number of years.  In the UK, the leading case 
in this area is the decision in Bland [2]. The case considered the circumstances where it 
would be lawful for Medical Doctors to stop feeding an individual in a permanent vegetative 
state. In Bland Lord Goff of Chieveley found that brain stem activity would be enough to 
consider an individual as alive.1 Edwin Jenner’s findings, therefore, in The Walking Dead 
seem to indicate that zombies would be considered, for the purposes of law, as living. Lord 
Goff indicated, however, a number of circumstances in which it would be acceptable to 
deprive someone of their life. He pointed towards lawful execution, self-defence and 
withdrawal of medical treatment as potential legal justifications [2:864]. For now we will 
continue with withdrawal of medical treatment.   
 
   Lord Goff was careful to draw a distinction, as he saw it, between acts and omissions. He 
found that withdrawal of medical treatment could be justified if it were no longer in the best 
interests of the patient.2 However, in no circumstances were Doctors allowed to actively 
‘bring his patient's life to an end’ continuing that ‘…it is not lawful for a doctor to bring 
about [a patient’s] death, even though that course is prompted by a humanitarian desire to end 
                                                          
1 [1993] A.C. 789 Page 863. Confirmed in NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust B v H [2001] 1 ALL E.R. 801. This is not to 
say that there are no other approaches. See, for example, [22] and [35] who advocate positions whereby the 
threshold for determining personhood is raised to include consciousness. This is, at present however, not the 
legal approach and would present some danger for those with Alzheimer’s or Dementia. See, for example, [5] 
at 55. 
2 Or, perhaps, more correctly that patients in permanent vegetative states no longer had best interests. [1993] 
A.C. 789 Page 868. As Lord Mustill notes ‘The distressing truth which must not be shirked is that is that the 
proposed conduct is not in the best interests of Anthony Bland, for he has no best interests of any kind.’ [1993] 
A.C. 789 Page 897. This is echoed by the opinion of John Harris who notes that ‘On the view of personhood I 
have developed, “ending the life of a non-person cannot do them a moral wrong” for the simple and sufficient 
reason that “they” do not exist to be wronged or indeed to be harmed in this way. There is no person present, 
no one who could value life. If the non-person cannot value life, they can lose nothing that they value if they 
lose their life, nothing that is or could be of value to them. They cannot therefore be wronged in this way.’ 
[22:55] 
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his suffering, however great that suffering may be’ [2:865]. Although personhood is not 
directly discussed by the judges in this case it can be inferred that the active killing of an 
individual in a permanent vegetative state interferes with both their autonomy and their 
bodily integrity [7]. The distinction between act and omission, therefore, is based upon the 
personhood of the individual. Applying this to the zombies in The Walking Dead it could be 
argued that under current UK law they are deserving of legal personhood and, moreover, that 
it would be illegal to kill or otherwise injure them; despite the fact that they cannot feel, hear, 
or understand this. The lack of capacity that zombies display does not mean that other 
individuals do not owe them a duty of care.  
 
   The figure of the zombie, therefore, highlights the contextual and subjective elements of 
personhood. How an individual can be a person in one context, but not in another. This 
contextual approach to personhood is supported by anthropological accounts of PVS. Bird-
David and Israeli, for example, highlight: 
 
…the dynamic complexity of PVS personhood within this social world, arguing for 
multiple, shifting personhoods of PVS patients. We describe how the institutional 
definition of the PVS patient as one who lacks awareness of himself or herself and his 
or her environment involves a process, which we treat as “emptying” the PVS patient 
of what in received (biomedical) common wisdom is considered the defining core of 
his or her personhood. We also show how, alongside this process, expressions of other 
senses of personhood appear and disappear, and we elaborate, in particular, on an 
emergent fluid, relational personhood. [5:55]  
    
   Personhood, in these states of PVS is negotiated between caretakers, family members, law 
and medicine highlighting the interaction between discursive, institutional and corporeal 
understandings of personhood. Personhood in these circumstances is never static but always 
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‘situational and emerging’ [5:57]. This medical and somewhat literal understanding of the 
zombie, however, can be seen in tandem with Agamben’s understanding of ‘bare life’ [1] and 
an understanding of the zombie as a signifier. 
 
Zombies, Personhood and Bare Life  
 
One of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics (which will continue to 
increase in our century) is its constant need to redefine the threshold in life that 
distinguishes and separates what is inside from outside…. Once zoē is politicized by 
declarations of rights, the distinctions and thresholds that make it possible to isolate 
sacred life must be newly defined. And when natural life is wholly included in the 
polis – and this much has, by now, already happened – these thresholds pass, as we 
will see, beyond the dark boundaries separating life from death in order to identify a 
new living dead man, a new sacred man. [1: 134]  
 
   In distinguishing between zoē (biological life) and bios (political life) Agamben lays the 
foundations for an understanding of living humans (such as refugees) who are forced to live 
outside of juridical structures and, as such, the accompanying human rights. Agamben refers 
to such individuals as ‘bare life,’ individuals who ‘remain included in politics in the form of 
the exception, that is, something that is included solely through an exclusion’ [1:11]. Dayan 
traces similar political outcasts with reference to ‘Criminals, Security Threats. Terrorists. 
Enemy Aliens. Illegal Immigrants. Migrant Contaminants. Unlawful Enemy Alien 
Combatants [and] Ghost Detainees’ [10:22]. These debates are compelling and perhaps 
demonstrate a growing cultural concern with the ways in which persons are made and 
unmade. Developing an analysis of personhood through the literature on PVS we can see that 
similarities lie in their focus upon acts and omissions. In each of these cases the individuals 
concerned would be unlikely to be lawfully killed by the state but there would be no such 
delimitation in terms of omission. Here, again, we can trace the relationship between 
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activities and embodiment on both micro and macro levels. In these cases, however, we have 
a mix of legal and illegal activities (some with state sanctions) and a mixture of legal and 
illegal bodies; the combinations of which lead to a suspension of personhood in the context in 
which they arise.  Though clearly not Agamben’s concern, the zombie acts as a logical 
extension of the premise (and promise) of bare life; life that exists outside of the confines of 
the juridical order which is capable of being killed but not sacrificed. Though some might 
argue that this literal understanding of bare life is a little inelegant, attention is drawn to it in 
order to tease out a larger question intertwined with Agamben’s concerns that the category of 
bare life is increasing to become the normative standard. Namely, can we understand the 
zombie apocalypse as a signifier of this shifting normative standard?  
 
    The figure of the zombie (and our growing cultural anxieties around it) highlight a 
complex set of problems around who or what may be termed legal persons and, moreover, 
whether personhood itself is a conceptually useful device. Whilst there is a problem in the 
claim that some individuals (such as refugees, or women) are not human, there does not seem 
to be the same problems around the denial of personhood to such groups (at least in terms of 
delimiting their actions or autonomy) and the subsequent denial of their rights [29, 41] . The 
zombie, under this analysis, becomes the logical endpoint of a system that is happy to place 
its subjects in a near constant state of exception [1, 10]. Moreover, the subjects themselves 
are complicit in this system; Rick Grimes, for example, early in the comic book canon 
believes himself and his family to be persons but that others are a potential threat and as such, 
underserving of personhood and/or, in some instances, life. The Walking Dead, therefore, can 
perhaps be seen as a radical indictment of current society and in particular the values and 
obligations that we owe to each other. The individualism (and subsequent selfishness) that 
has come to characterise contemporary society is a logical extension of a rights based system 
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that places the individual at its core. Implicit within this system is a selfishness that places 
individual rights over and above the rights of others characterising these others as non-
persons; at least on a temporal basis. 
 
   The zombie, therefore, can be read as a signifier of the growing presence (and acceptance) 
of bare life and that humans are capable of being rendered as non-persons. To combat this we 
must reject not the figure of the zombie, but the concept of personhood. As it is through the 
fiction of personhood that bodies can be rendered as outside of the scope of law. The zombie 
highlights the ubiquity of personhood and, in doing so, shows us the fallacy of the concept. 
At the same time, it also renders personhood’s logical alternative – humanity – conceptually 
vulnerable. It is argued, however, that we must embrace this rupturing. The contested (and 
besieged) boundaries of humanity mean that, somewhat ironically, using humanity as a 
starting point for legal relations allows us to include more entities than if we were using the 
supposedly abstract conception of personhood. Cyborgs, admixed embryos and zombies, to 
name but three, would all have a more legitimate stake in law than under the current rhetoric 
of the person. The human is a useful concept, it is argued, for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
the human is a material concept based within the body. Arguments in feminist and queer 
theory have highlighted the value in such an approach [14, 18, 19] as it prevents the abstract 
(such as personhood) being filled with a singular type of body (the heterosexual white able 
bodied male). The human body in contrast, is always variegated in its potentiality for gender, 
race, sexuality and ability. As such, it is the indeterminacy of the human that is theoretically 
appealing [20]. Similarly, the boundaries of humanity are constantly being contested, through 
admixed embryos, cyborgs and other entities [15]. Again, this is no reason to abandon the 
concept of the human; it is all the more reason to embrace it. It is perhaps because of the 
porousness represented within the human that the term is so difficult to define. Genetically, 
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the human is contested by entities such as admixed embryos [13, 34, 40]. Materially, the 
human body is ever more problematized by its relationship with technology [20]. 
Institutionally, the term has been distorted beyond its meanings as corporations gain ‘human’ 
rights [18]. Discursively, the term still has some political potency however. Humanity, for the 
most part, is yet to be abandoned in favour of the post-human. A common humanity still 
pervades political discussion and remains, at least theoretically, appealing. Perhaps this is 
because the political human, is referring to humans or humankind and as such encompasses 
the term in all its variegated glory. The human that this article refers to is a human with the 
potential to be anything and as such is a human becoming rather than a human being. Rather 
than the static approach taken to the person the human is dynamic and incapable of existing 
outside of neither its context nor its embodiment, real rather than imagined.  
 
   As a result, this article agrees with Esposito’s position that “the essential failure of human 
rights, their inability to restore the broken connection between rights and life, does not take 
place in spite of the affirmation of the ideology of the person but rather because of it” [12:5]. 
Moreover, this article suggests that the complete conceptual rejection of legal personhood 
would actually be more effective in ensuring rights for vulnerable people and potentially, 
halts the spread of those individuals who are outside of the juridical system. This, in turn, will 
have two complimentary effects. Firstly, rejecting the concept of personhood and focussing 
on a legal system grounded in the diversity of humanity would allow contemporary 
conceptions of normativity to become destabilized, particularly around its borders. Current 
abstract approaches to personhood can be jettisoned on the basis of their conflation with 
heterosexual white male bodies [18, 29]. Secondly, it is suggested that vulnerable subjects 
fail to be endowed with rights under current approaches to legal personhood [12]. 
Personhood’s continuing Cartesian separation from the corporeal, as a consequence, is too 
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open to abuse. A legal system that placed embodiment at its centre, rather than personhood, it 
is proposed, would provide remedy to at least some vulnerable individuals currently outside 
of the juridical order. Personhood, as a consequence, plays an essential role in law’s 
neutrality in discussions around inequality and bodily integrity. It has also been central to the 
replaying of Cartesian dualisms where appeals to embodiment are countered by law’s 
inability to think beyond the person. Consequently, the law continues to utilize an empty 
understanding of personhood which fails to make distinctions between bodies, corporations 
and other entities and as such can all be deemed artificial.   
 
    Both Anna Grear [18] and Ngaire Naffine [29] have put forwards theories of personhood 
that attempt to recognise the importance of embodiment. This article acknowledges the 
intentions of these theories but questions the theoretical usefulness of the person. In addition, 
this article posits that the concept of personhood is harmful to those who find themselves 
outside of its reach on either a temporal basis (for example during pregnancy [29, 41]), for 
longer periods of time (such as refugees, [1]) and potentially for the walking dead. Grear’s 
conception of personhood, in particular, struggles to break away from abstract (and thus 
potentially gendered) conceptions. Her location of personhood within the intersex body is at 
first glance persuasive, but ultimately enables personhood to maintain its distance from the 
body and thus to retain its abstract gendered nature. Rejecting personhood, at least for 
humans, is more theoretically useful as it forces law to acknowledge the differences present 
within the human body.  
 
   Re-situating these contentions within the world of The Walking Dead we can see the 
potential importance of placing humanity above and beyond notions of personhood. In recent 
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issues, such as All Out War (Parts I & II), Rick Grimes highlights the weight that he places on 
all human life; regardless of gender, race or (dis)ability, with the possible exception of his 
own life. Although facing huge provocation, Rick is unwilling to sacrifice political prisoners. 
Exactly how this will play out remains to be seen, though we might hazard a guess that things 
will not remain peaceful for long. Rick reminds us of the possibility of a world in which our 
leaders and state sacrifice themselves for their people rather than the other way round; a 
world in which no one is considered bare life. The debate around whether zombies are people 
are largely settled within The Walking Dead, Hershel conceded that he was wrong to consider 
them persons. Despite this, the zombie remains a pertinent thought experiment in our 
discussions around personhood, humanity and our relationship with the state. Indeed, if we 
see the zombie as a signifier of the refugee through Agamben’s reading of bare life we find 
Hershel’s arguments all the more persuasive. In fact, his argument becomes a 
phenomenological lament for his family and friends. The closeness that Hershel feels to those 
involved allows him to put himself in the position of the zombie and, ultimately, to feel 
empathy for them. This reading again underlines the importance of placing humanity 
(broadly conceived) over and above the artificial legal constraints of concepts such as 
personhood and citizenship. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Because of its universal applicability, personhood is seen as the only semantic field 
that can possibly overlap the two spheres of law and humanity, separated as they are 
by the national ideology of citizenship. This means that a concept like that of human 
rights is only conceivable and viable through the lexicon of personhood. [12:3] 
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   The figure of the zombie as represented in The Walking Dead presents us with an 
interesting and complex array of choices around personhood. In terms of existing medical 
law, zombies would be seen as persons capable of being legally killed through omissions but 
not through positive acts. Certainly, these kinds of struggles have been articulated within the 
world of The Walking Dead, particularly in the early relationship between Rick Grimes and 
Hershel Greene. However, this discussion of acts and omissions also runs through 
Agamben’s understanding of bare life; individuals who exist outside the current juridical 
order. Certainly, zombies can be understood in these terms, but moving them from the literal 
to the role of signifier perhaps presents us with a set of more pertinent questions and cultural 
anxieties. Does The Walking Dead present us with a world in which bare life has become the 
political norm? And if this is the case, how much does this centre around ambiguous 
conceptions of personhood that are capable of removing individuals from the scope of human 
right? Ultimately, we do not need to welcome the zombie into our legal system, however, we 
can use it as a warning against the view that legal atomistic and abstract approaches to 
personhood have blinded us to our common humanity. Appeals to personhood have 
prevented us from considering the values that we associate with humanity that should be 
respected in law. But at the same time personhood has also rigidly demarcated the boundaries 
of the human. By rejecting personhood we can begin to assess the permeability of these 
boundaries; particularly in regards to the boundaries between the human and the animal; the 
foetus and the adult; life and death. In conclusion, we can see that the figure of the zombie is 
an important theoretical tool in thinking through our relationships with the law, medicine and 
the state. 
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